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MILITARY ASCENDANCY, CIVILIAN DISINTEREST: CONTEMPORARY CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN AMERICA

A Monograph
By
Colonel William S. Knightly
Infantry



School of Advanced Military Studies
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Abstract

Military Ascendancy, Civilian Disinterest: Contemporary Civil- Military Relations in America.
Col. William S. Knightly. 48 pages.

Numerous contemporary political and military observers have suggested that there are profound problems in contemporary American civil- military relations. Some have even suggested that there is in fact a "crisis" in civil- military relations. Base closings, the departure of ROTC from college campuses and the general geographic retreat of the military from large portions of the country are reducing the opportunity for civil- military contact. Large numbers of meritocratic civilians are currently assuming leadership positions in all levels of the federal government. Members of this civilian merit class rarely serve in the military and hence may have little understanding of the military they supervise. Concurrent with the rise of the meritocracy, the Goldwater- Nichols Defense Reorganization Act has produced a highly sophisticated and centralized military establishment more willing to assert itself in strategic issues.

This monograph examines these assertions and seeks to analyze their validity. The methodology consists of a review of the historic and political legacy that forms the traditional foundation of the country's concept of civilian control of the military. Special emphasis is placed on the influence of classical liberalism and the ideas of the Federalists and the Jeffersonians.

The nation's emerging civilian meritocratic leadership class is examined along with its ability to exercise effective control over a sophisticated military establishment. The character and background of the meritocracy is contrasted with the nature of the current U.S. military establishment.

The conclusions reached in this monograph suggest that a genuine "crisis" in civil- military relations does not exist. There is, however, an evolving trend that contrasts an ever more educated, centralized and sophisticated military against a civilian leadership class that has little understanding or interest in military affairs. The challenge is not so much a military that is insubordinate, but rather a civilian class with minimal first hand exposure to the military and a reluctance to assert itself in strategic- military affairs. Specific recommendations are proposed to improve understanding among the participants in the civil- military equation.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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Contents

I. Introduction.....	1
II. Liberalism and the Foundations of America Civil-Military Relations.....	8
III.. Civilian Decline, Military Ascendency.....	16
IV. The Media and the Military.....	31
V. Conclusions.....	40
Endnotes.....	47
Bibliography.....	58

I: Introduction

The history of civil-military relations in the United States has always been contentious. Americans have had ambivalent feelings about their relationship with the military, beginning with the earliest debates concerning military powers in The Federalist papers. Despite occasional tension, the relationship has been characterized by a consistent subordination of the military to the direction and control of legitimate civilian authorities. Recently, however, a small yet vocal group of historians, academicians, and military officers have advanced the notion that contemporary U.S. civil-military relations are entering a period of uncertainty and increased stress. They continue to express alarm at what they see as diminished civilian control over a more assertive military establishment.

Eliot Cohen, professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, has emphasized the importance of proper civil-military balance: "...the most important problem of all for the future of American defense policy; the establishment of civil-military relations in which civilians exercise proper supervision of their military subordinates."¹

According to many observers, profound problems and significant challenges typify contemporary US civil-military relations. Richard Kohn, a noted historian from the University of North Carolina has suggested that there is today, a "crisis" in civil-military relations: "The U.S. military is now more alienated from its

civilian leadership than at any time in American history . . . "2 Historian Russell Weigley has declared that civilian control "faces an uncertain future."3 Professor Cohen, has written on the need to "reestablish civilian control."4 He has also recently stated that "It is imperative that the the United States come to terms with this crisis."5

These are serious allegations. If true, they have significant implications for the American notion of civilian control of the military. It might be premature to declare a "crisis" in civil-military relations based on recent events, such as the Somalia intervention and the dispute over the military's policy on homosexuals; however, they typify incidents that have caused some stress in the civil-military relationship.

In a nation that has a classically liberal political tradition and a historical aversion to standing armies, the large American defense establishment is an unusual legacy. Historically, Americans have been content to relegate the military establishment ". . . to its posts and camps to do whatever it is the military does, but with the minimum diversion of public attention and funds."6 This attitude has been very much at the heart of the American tradition. However, the strategic evolution of the United States, and in particular the cold war, has increased the country's toleration for standing military forces. The nation with the built-in antipathy to standing militaries had by 1950 a standing military establishment that had penetrated into almost every aspect of American life. This "gargantuan establishment" required a network of arms producers and business

suppliers that touched every community in the nation.⁷ Eventually, the Cold War induced the United States to produce "the most powerful military establishment in the world."⁸

As recently as 1991 the defense establishment employed about two million uniformed men and women and one million civilians with an annual budget of 300 billion dollars.⁹ Even in the post Cold War era, the Pentagon stands as a symbol of a large and embedded military-industrial institution.

This circumstance, although comforting to most Americans, has come with a political and financial cost. To maintain such an armed force, the U.S. may have permanently altered its traditional civilian-military balance. The price of maintaining a large standing military force, necessitated by the Cold War, may have been erosion of civilian influence over the military. A retired officer and scholar notes:

In ways that many Americans fail to appreciate, the imperative of keeping the nation on a perpetual, semi-mobilized footing transformed the traditional civil--military equation. As a result, the Pentagon's influence mushroomed, mostly at civilian expense.¹⁰

The nature of civil-military relations has indeed been affected with the rise in prominence of the U.S. military establishment after World War II. "The Cold War constrained liberal tendencies in U.S. society by forcing an outward orientation, encouraging acceptance of . . . the military, and amplifying the need for national consensus."¹¹ In the post Cold War era it is likely that the military will continue to play an important role in American society generally and in the

formulation and execution of national security policy.¹² Balancing a classically liberal tradition, averse to standing peacetime armies, with a large, influential, professional military establishment still appears to be a challenge for American society.

Four conditions appear particularly problematic for current and future civil-military relations. First, as the U.S. military continues to drawdown in the post cold-war era, it is becoming increasingly isolated from American society. Base closings, the elimination of ROTC programs at selected colleges and universities and the general withdrawal of the military from specific regions of the country are limiting the opportunity for civil-military contact. Base closings have meant the end of military presence in many parts of the United States. "Rather than a truly national distribution, the military seems to be moving toward location solely on the southern and western littoral of the nation."¹³ The result is that large regions of the country, particularly the Northeast and Midwest, as well as their congressional representatives, have little or no first hand experience with the military.¹⁴

Secretary of Defense Perry in an announcement in February of 1995 disclosed that the Pentagon intends to close or realign 146 military bases across the United States.¹⁵ This is not, however, the end of this trend. Perry has further recommended another round of base closures in three or four years, adding to the military's general retreat from the nation.¹⁶

Secondly, as the military continues to downsize, its organizational structure

has become more centralized and arguably more efficient. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has had the effect of presenting the civilian leadership with perhaps the most unified, centralized and focused military leadership in the country's history.¹⁷

Professional and educational requirements mandated for senior officers by Goldwater- Nichols will mean that future civilian appointees in the Department of Defense will confront a far more powerful and sophisticated Joint Staff than ever before.¹⁸ The result is a professional yet ever more intellectually, organizationally and doctrinally isolated military establishment. This intellectual separation may in fact be more significant than the physical isolation brought about by base closings and the gradual withdrawal of the military from society. Coupled with what some have described as inattention and abdication by civilians in the White House and the Pentagon, these factors bear close attention.¹⁹

The third factor apt to influence civil- military relations is the changing nature of modern civilian leadership who must ultimately exercise control over the armed forces. Increasingly contemporary American civilian leadership bears little resemblance in background to the military it supervises. The emergence of a civilian meritocracy that emphasizes educational achievement over practical experience, has characterized the evolution of modern American civilian leadership.²⁰

The meritocratic class, prominent in both major political parties, is now coming to dominate key positions in government particularly in the legislative

and executive branches. Members of the meritocratic class rarely serve in the military. Accordingly they may have only an abstract understanding of those who do serve. Lacking first hand contact with a shrinking, ever more isolated military, the potential exists for a significant gap between the nation's leadership class and the military it must supervise.

An officer recently quoted in the Wall Street Journal highlighted the developing cultural gap between civilian society and the military: "We don't know them and they don't know us."²¹ This perspective when coupled with the notion that in the post Cold War era " . . . the demands of American society are likely to be more intolerant and corrosive of military professionalism" may indicate future strains in civil-military relations.²²

The last factor affecting contemporary civil-military relations is the excessive tension that exists between the media and the military. Both the media and the military have contributed to a continuing mutual estrangement. Media resentment remains high over the military's attempt to control information flow, most recently during the Gulf War. Suspicions of media aims, methods, and competence still permeate the professional military. A prominent retired Marine Corps General has stated that " . . . the credo of the military seems to be duty, honor, country, and hate the media."²³ In an era where first hand contact with the military is limited, the media is often society's primary source of information concerning the military; hence, its role is more important than ever.

By any measure the media-military relationship is antagonistic and corrosive to good civil-military relations.

This monograph addresses the historical, political and traditional nature of civil-military relations in the United States and the emergence of a civilian meritocracy and its affect on contemporary American civil- military relations. The intellectual isolation of the military from society and its growing centralization and professionalism as mandated by the Goldwater- Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 are examined. Likewise, an analysis of media-military relations is presented.

U.S. society, both civilian and military, generally assume civilian control without discussing the conditions necessary to sustain it or the forces that might erode it.²⁴ These historical, political, social and military forces have shaped the ambiguous sometimes adversarial relationship that exists between American society and its armed forces. " The end of the Cold War, in conjunction with the ongoing sociocultural diversification of the United States, may further isolate the military from mainstream U.S. culture and affect civil- military relations."²⁵

II: Liberalism and the Foundations of American Civil-Military Relations

Any comprehension of civil- military relations in the United States must necessarily include an understanding of U.S. history and political tradition . The country's colonial experience, the American Revolution, and the impact of the Federalists and Jeffersonians all have played a role in the formation of civil-military relations in America. Liberalism, has influenced the nation's collective attitude toward government and its relationship to military forces.

Liberalism has always been the dominant political ideology in the United States.²⁶ Liberal influence provided a substantial part of the foundation upon which America has developed its attitudes about and relations with the military. In contemporary U.S. society the term liberalism has come to have a polarizing ideological connotation not consistent with it's original meaning. The classical liberalism of the 18th century actually helped the founding fathers achieve a broad consensus.

Liberalism developed in early modern Europe in the struggle between civil institutions and monarchs.²⁷ A commitment to individualism, freedom, equality, private property, and democracy were characteristic of liberal thought. In its purest form, liberalism sought to expand civil liberties and to limit political authority in favor of constitutional representative government. It also promoted the rights to property and religious toleration.²⁸ A hallmark of liberal thinking

was its hostility to the prerogatives of kings, aristocrats, and the church. Liberals opposed arbitrary power exercised over the individual by the state and particularly the domination of foreign policy by militarists or even military considerations.²⁹

America's classic liberal orientation connotes social, political, and economic reform based on individual liberty. The tenets of liberalism professed liberty as a right belonging inherently to persons under the law. "Sovereignty of the monarch was increasingly legitimated by the theory that individuals had freely surrendered those rights to the sovereign."³⁰

These views were expounded by John Locke, a British advocate of classic liberalism. Locke claimed that men were endowed by nature and God with certain rights to life, liberty and prosperity. He said that men establish sovereign governments to protect those rights by free consent, and that whenever the sovereign breaks the contract by violating those rights, the people are free to overthrow the sovereign and reestablish a legitimately based government.³¹

Locke's ideas influenced the leading figures of the American Revolution. "The ideas of Locke. . . were as well known and respected in North America as they were in Europe. They underlay the Declaration of Independence."³² Liberalism's effect on the Declaration of Independence is clear:

The American Declaration of Independence was a liberal document in the Lockean mold; a radical assertion of the right of revolution enunciated by a political class of propertied gentry who resented the encroachment of royal government on their rights and royal officials on their prerogative of governance of the people.³³

Thomas Jefferson, usually regarded as the principal author of the Declaration of Independence, established a record of advocacy of classic liberal ideals of liberty, natural right, and majority rule.³⁴ On the subject of the military and specifically standing armies, Jefferson clearly expressed the skepticism of many of his American contemporaries. Jefferson saw standing militaries at once dangerous to freedom and a needless expense to the central government. In a letter to Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts written in 1799 he detailed his opposition to standing militaries.

I am for relying, for internal defense, on our militia solely, till actual invasion, and for such a naval force only as may protect our coasts and harbors from such depredations as we have experienced, and not for a standing army in time of peace, which, by its own expenses and the external wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with public burdens and sink us under them.³⁵

Jefferson concluded this letter by saying that "These . . . are my principles; they are unquestionably the principles of the great body of our fellow citizens."³⁶

Despite advocacy for a stronger central national defense presented by the authors of The Federalists papers, standing forces were not popular in the early years of the nation.³⁷ "Suspicion of standing armies remained strong in all regions of the country".³⁸

The geographic isolation of the country reinforced the dominance of

liberalism in the United States. The country had to rely for its security mainly upon its distance from the centers of foreign power.³⁹ The lack of external threats allowed Americans a sense of security, but obscured the role of power in foreign politics. Since America lacked both peasantry and a genuine aristocracy, it was not burdened with a feudal history as was Europe.⁴⁰ Therefore, the country developed without the same degree of class consciousness and was able to form its liberal traditions for the most part unencumbered by European influences.

Classical liberalism provided the common philosophical groundwork for both the liberal and conservative camps in early America.⁴¹ Liberalism held notable sway over the Founding Fathers. The writings of John Locke also influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution.⁴² Liberal attitudes toward the formation and sustainment of military forces were deeply imbedded in the framers. "Many framers of the Constitution held eighteenth century beliefs on the perfectibility of man and so were philosophically opposed to military force."⁴³ Few political principles were more widely known or more universally accepted in America during the country's foundation than the danger of standing armies in peacetime.⁴⁴

Naturally the issue of security and the role of the military in the new nation was prominent and contentious. The Constitutional Convention which convened in May 1787 addressed the difficult issue of determining the nature of the military establishment for the United States. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, hostility to standing armies was extremely high. An army

represented the ultimate instrument to terrorize or subjugate a population.

"Americans fashioned the standing army into the universal tool of despotism, perhaps the single institution most dangerous to balanced government and personal liberty."⁴⁵

Americans genuinely feared that standing armies would threaten their democracy either by conspiring to overthrow legitimate government or by serving as a catalyst to involve the country in foreign conflicts. Even James Madison, a federalist, felt so strongly about the subject that he proposed adding a clause to the Constitution that stated: ". . . armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil . . ." ⁴⁶

Elbridge Gerry, Jefferson's close friend from Massachusetts, actually tried at the Continental Congress to limit the regular army to 300 men. This move was defeated only after the personal intervention of George Washington.⁴⁷

Accordingly, the framers went to great lengths to limit military power. They divided authority over the military so that no one branch of government was in full control. The authority to raise and sustain forces was vested in Congress rather than in the President. The President, however, held the reins of command as the Commander -in-Chief.

There was one final check. The Founding Fathers believed that the people in the form of state militia (the modern day National Guard) would provide the ultimate check on the army. "However much some of the framers disdained the military prowess of the state forces, they accepted their value as an internal

counterweight to standing armies."⁴⁸ What the framers were attempting to fashion was "... a government so constructed that its military forces could neither attempt nor become the instrument for a coup d'etat: these were the fundamental objectives of the framers of the Constitution in national security."⁴⁹ In contemporary terms this concept has become known as civilian control of the military, an essential ingredient to any democracy.

Ironically the framers while providing checks and balances on the military did not provide a specific system of civilian control. "The United States Constitution, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, does not provide for civilian control."⁵⁰ This may seem surprising at first, but in reality the structure of the Constitution with its wide division of powers spread between national and state governments and between the President and Congress can actually hinder civilian control.

Arguably, civilian control would be more efficient if the military was relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head.⁵¹ The idea of civilian control assumed by the American people (and perhaps implied by the framers) is not a specified condition in the Constitution. "Civilian control is not a fact, but a process, that varies over time and is very much 'situational,' that is, dependent on the issues and personalities, civilian and military involved at any given point."⁵² Therefore it follows that significant responsibility for this "process" civilian control devolves to both civilian and military leadership.

The administration of civilian control requires some combination of experience, vigilance and intuition by the civilian leadership who must exercise control. In a practical sense the country has adopted a tradition of civilian control. Civilian control means that the policies and procedures governing all aspects of our military affairs are determined by civilian authorities.⁵³ While most Americans would probably not dispute the definition or desirability of civilian control there is considerable debate in contemporary America about how to achieve it.

America's historical traditions and liberal outlook have woven suspicion of excess military authority throughout the pattern of American life. At its very essence, "... liberalism does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and functions."⁵⁴ Historian Samuel Huntington has articulated a frank analysis of liberalism and the military: "Liberalism is divided in its views on war but it is united in its hostility to the military profession"⁵⁵

Developing America was for the most part, able to avoid military challenges to its liberal ideals. Geography consistently shielded the country from the European intrigues. "The anguishing dilemmas of security that tormented European nations did not touch America for nearly 150 years."⁵⁶ Eventually the sheer size and strength of America propelled it into the center of the international arena.⁵⁷ There have been some notable exceptions to America's general "revulsion toward international affairs."⁵⁸ However even up to the 1920s and 1930s, the country was incapable of believing that anything outside the Western

Hemisphere could possibly affect its security.⁵⁹ The popular support of the armed forces during World War II, the Cold War and even the Persian Gulf War may be in retrospect, individual and conditional exceptions to the country's consistent tradition of opposition to large standing forces.

Understanding the notion of civilian control in America with any degree of clarity requires a broad historical and political perspective. This is especially true for professional soldiers, who sometimes find themselves lamenting a "lack of support" for the military or even perceived "hostility" toward the military establishment. These attitudes toward the military are quintessentially American in character and actually reflect the finest liberal traditions of the Founding Fathers. As one contemporary military and political author observed, ". . . America has tended intellectually to remain a Jeffersonian democracy, with Jefferson's distrust of all things military."⁶⁰

III: Civilian Decline, Military Ascendency

The "process" of civilian control in America has always been unique. Since the framers did not envision a standing professional force, they did not provide for objective civilian control in the U.S. constitution.⁶¹ Instead of a pyramid-like hierarchial structure with a single civilian entity at the top, the President, Congress, and even the courts exercise varying degrees of subjective control. The framers notion of civilian control, checked the uses to which civilians might put military force. It did not emphasize control of the military itself.⁶² The militia, acting as a counterweight, also mitigated against the rise of a professional military requiring definitive control measures.

Nonetheless, civilian control in America has always implied a military subordinate to civil authority and civilian leadership willing, able and interested in asserting the proper degree of control. This model is fundamentally intact today; however, subtle evolutions in the the country's contemporary civilian leadership class and in the military establishment have the potential to affect traditional American civil-military intercourse.

A. The Civilians

American civilian leadership in the post Cold War era may be entering a phase in which its nature and background are distinctly different from previous civilian leadership. An identifiable group is emerging, heralded by social commentators as the meritocracy or meritocratic class.⁶³ Today, an ascendent

civilian meritocracy is gradually replacing past governing elites.⁶⁴ This social phenomenon may have an impact on traditional civilian control of the military in modern America.

The meritocratic class is defined primarily by a single collective attribute: its educational achievement. "The essential formative experience of members of the Meritocratic Upper Class is educational overachievement."⁶⁵ Educational achievement has more value and significance for the meritocracy than demonstrated practical experience. The meritocracy differs primarily from past elites in that wealth and/or class distinction based on family pedigree are not its defining characteristics. It is a distinctive group with its own values and its arguably own way of life: "They are . . . people who weren't necessarily born to affluence but who gained entree to America's elite on the strength of talent and academic achievement"⁶⁶ According to an indepth analysis appearing in the Washington Post, members of this class choose specific career fields and work as doctors, lawyers, investment bankers, management consultants, professors and increasingly in the influential fields of journalism, entertainment, and information processing.⁶⁷ Sometimes called the "new elite," the meritocratic class while having significant representation in the professions, tends to gravitate toward careers that advise, arrange and transact. They shun large corporate organizations and avoid "lifer" type occupations such as the civil service.⁶⁸ Significantly, the merit class does not serve in the military.⁶⁹

President Clinton, identified by US News and World Report as "the first

meritocratic president," has relied on a meritocratic system that has placed emphasis on educational credentials.⁷⁰ To some observers, the White House has become an instructive example of the ascendancy of the meritocracy in contemporary America. US News and World Report describes the White House staff as "... well educated but inexperienced twentysomethings."⁷¹ Fred Barnes, writing in The New Republic, indicated that "sixty-three of 450 White House staffers are 23 years or younger."⁷²

The meritocracy has been accused by some of isolating itself from the mainstream of the country. Nicholas Lemann, national correspondent for Atlantic, has suggested that the meritocracy is becoming increasingly estranged from U.S. society: "...the Meritocratic Upper Class, already fairly isolated from the rest of the country is becoming more so . . . "⁷³

In his new book The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, Christopher Lasch underscores the growing gap between the merit class and the rest of the country. A recent BusinessWeek review of this book summarized Lasch's view:

Members of the new aristocracy of brains, he asserts, have made a stunning break with past elites: They don't care about middle America and the working poor. Their loyalties are not national. American members of this elite are more comfortable with their peers in Jakarta or Buenos Aires than mingling with the bourgeoisie at home...And since they pay for private schools, private police, and other private services, they have no sense of civic attachment or public service.⁷⁴

Writing for the Washington Post, long time columnist David Broder commented on the lack of bonds that the current political leadership class has with the American people.

the experiences of the previous generation of national leaders, who lived through the Great Depression and served in their country's uniform during World War II, gave them common bonds with virtually all their compatriots, bonds that the 60s and 70s simply did not produce for the boomers.⁷⁵

Since the end of conscription in 1973, military service has ceased to be a common experience shared by a significant part of the population. The end of compulsory, military service in this country meant the disappearance of yet another source of our common values and experiences as Americans. Service in uniform, even if for a brief period provided for people the opportunity to share in an identical experience.⁷⁶ In post World War II America the highly educated meritocratic classes (and for that matter the upper class) do not as a rule serve in the military and are rarely found in full time public service. "There will be no more Bob Lovetts, Jack Kennedys, or George Bushes in the future all-volunteer military"⁷⁷ This phenomenon became apparent during the Vietnam conflict and has been even more pronounced since then. For example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the nations leading educational institutions, went through the entire Vietnam War reportedly without sustaining a single war fatality among its graduates.⁷⁸

Even today, one is hard-pressed to find Ivy League graduates or their equivalent among serving officers or enlisted ranks in the armed forces.

Almost never seen in uniform are the people who are most likely to influence foreign policy and who will make the decisions to send U.S. troops into battle. The well-educated men and women who inhabit government bureaucracies, academia and the media rarely serve in the military, and worse, don't know anyone who does.⁷⁹

Many in the civilian world, particularly the merit class, may believe the military to be an unfamiliar, even uninteresting, institution. Even the more senior spectrum of the merit class serving in the current government administration is characterized by a lack of military experience. This is unusual for an age group that statistically has a large proportions of veterans. As a whole, 43% of men in the U.S. population, age 39 to 59, are military veterans. For men in the same age bracket who currently occupy Senate confirmed government positions only 18 percent are veterans. The current White House staff in this age group who are military veterans is only 8 percent.⁸⁰ Overall, 47 percent of the Clinton administration's appointees are women, who are less likely to have military experience than men; of the approximately 1,000 male designees for appointed positions, only about ten percent have military experience.⁸¹ As the meritocracy occupies positions of responsibility within the government, this unfamiliarity with the military can be detrimental because "... politicians will simply fail to understand what it is their militaries can and cannot do."⁸²

One critic has pointed out:

Many people in this country, both Democrats and Republicans, who strongly influence the most important decisions a nation ever makes-- whether or not to send its sons and daughters to die-- increasingly have zero knowledge of who our servicemen and women are, or even where they come from.⁸³

Indifference toward the military characterizes merit class attitudes as opposed to anti-military bias. "While antimilitarism is definitely a factor, it appears that the Meritocratic Class suffers more from ignorance about the military than from antimilitary bigotry."⁸⁴ Writing in the Wake Forest Law Review, Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap has articulated a comprehensive analysis of merit class attitudes toward the military:

The Meritocratic leadership elites display a postmodern militarism that considers the armed forces much like a bright, loyal and hardworking servant who conveniently undertakes difficult and unattractive tasks, but who most assuredly lacks the enterprising aptitude for invidious ambition . . . as with any valued employee, the Meritocrats desire cordial relations with the armed forces, but avoid personal association with a military that they view as intellectually plebeian and therefore unlike themselves.⁸⁵

Some see more negative attitudes emerging among the nation's civilian leaders class. Ultimately these attitudes may affect the ability of future government administrations to attract objective, qualified civilians to oversee the armed forces.

Presidents today have a more difficult time finding . . . people to put in charge of the military. Eliminating the draft and throwing ROTC out of the leading universities created a new generation of political elites who not only know little about the military but have been encouraged to see it as evil.⁸⁶

If future administrations fail to attract quality civilians or if civilians fail to assert themselves in relation to their military subordinates, the civil-military balance could shift in the direction of a more assertive military. James Burk of Texas A&M University has written that

A number of academics, who are close students of the military, have noted what they think is an erosion in the quality of civilian control over the military and a growth in the military professional's overt exercise of political influence on the military's behalf.⁸⁷

There is a contrary view. Perhaps the most convincing rebuttal of those who see the emergence of weak or indifferent civilian leadership comes from former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell USA, (RET). In a strong endorsement of the character of contemporary civilian leadership (former Secretaries of Defense), he said:

My activities as Chairman were always taken with the prior knowledge of my civilian leaders. It was not lost on me that Mr. Cheney had shown he knew how to fire generals. Mr. Aspin showed he could reject my recommendations because of broader issues he had to consider.⁸⁸

The nation's current political and government officials are generally silent on the the subject of civil-military relations. Politicians have not demonstrated the alarm shown by the academics and historians who belong to the "crisis" school of civil-military thought. Understandably, it is not in the self interest of any politician to voice public doubt over his or her ability to control the military. Nonetheless, no prominent figure in the current administration nor in either major political party has expressed public concern on the current state of civil-military relations. This could mean that no major problems exist in the relationship or

that for political reasons, officials have chosen to ignore the subject.

In a democracy, the country and its civilian leadership should understand and feel identification with its armed forces. "When a country looks at its fighting forces in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face it sees there will be its own."⁸⁹ This may not be the case in contemporary America, as civilian society and its military appear to drifting apart. "Both the meritocratic elites and the American people fail to comprehend today's military from which they are increasingly estranged."⁹⁰ To some degree there has always been a privileged class in America, but it has never been so dangerously isolated from its surroundings.⁹¹

The country has come to expect a high level of competence the people who occupy the top elected and appointed positions in government. The trend of decreasing military service among civilian leaders is not of itself cause to threaten this competence. It is, however, hard to comprehend how the lack of any contact or familiarity with the armed forces can be anything but detrimental to the civilians who must exercise civilian control of the military.

B. The Military

If the nature of America's emerging civilian leadership class is changing, the the same can be said for America's military establishment. Events of recent years have affected the military in unique ways.

The breath and pace of the post Cold War drawdown is clearly having an impact that is felt both by the military and society in general. In Europe for

instance, the U.S. Army plans to reduce its total number of installations to 82 by 1996. This compares to a high of 511 installations in 1990.⁹² Likewise, the Department of Defense recently announced recommendations to close over 146 military installations in the United States.⁹³ These base closings throughout the U.S. are contributing to the military's growing physical isolation. This physical isolation greatly reduces the society's opportunities for contact with its military forces. "As the military shrinks, fewer and fewer civilians will have direct military experience upon which to fall back on."⁹⁴

Another significant factor is causing change in the military: the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The refinement, centralization and efficiency of the armed forces resulting from the mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is remarkable.⁹⁵ Few military reforms can match the impact of Goldwater- Nichols. The practical effects of the Goldwater- Nichols Act are creating a gap in professional education and organizational sophistication that appears to be dividing the military from its civilian leadership. An unintended side effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the dramatic increase in power of the uniformed military and the resulting challenge to the degree of civilian control imposed during the tenure of Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.⁹⁶

A high level of organization is generally attributed to the military as an institution. Military forces by their nature are more highly organized (but not necessarily more effective) than most civilian institutions: "... because of their centralization, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunications and esprit de corps, armies are much more highly organized than any civilian body."⁹⁷ Today however the nation appears to be faced with a situation where its emerging civilian leadership class (the meritocracy) is increasingly confronted by a senior officer corps more broadly educated, qualified and focused than ever before. Mackubin Thomas Owens argued in a recent issue of Joint Forces Quarterly that "... there is a growing disparity between the quality of military officers and their civilian counterparts."⁹⁸ Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, writing in the Winter 1995 edition of The Washington Quarterly, support the view that there is asymmetry between civilian leadership and military subordinates.

U.S. civil-military relations. . . are built on an ingrained asymmetry between the military, organized as a coherent, corporate body, and its civilian overseers, who are not. A well-structured career pattern makes it easier for the military to deliberately improve its political and strategic acumen.⁹⁹

The reforms that have resulted from Goldwater-Nichols particularly in the area of Professional Military Education (PME) are contributed to this disparity.

War College level PME helps to foster a military perspective with a coherence that is often absent among the civilian officials who make defense policy.¹⁰⁰ A meritocratic leadership class simply has no equivalent common educational nor organizational common denominator.

"Civilians are largely self-taught, their knowledge often less systematic than that of their military counterparts."¹⁰¹ Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap once again provides an insightful yet debatable analysis: "Armed with the sophisticated war-college educations heavy in economics and politics..., military officers of the 1990s are well equipped to challenge civilian leaders in a multitude of arenas."¹⁰²

A recent article in Government Executive supports Dunlap's assertion.

Tight ethics restrictions have discouraged good candidates for top civilian posts at the Pentagon from serving. And as an unintended result, the pendulum of power over defense affairs has swung from the civilian to the military side of the government's national security apparatus.¹⁰³

Many commentators have suggested that the military has started to challenge civilian authority in ways that are unhealthy for the nation. Two military entities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff have been identified as wielding excessive power vis-a-vis the nation's civilian leadership. Military commentator Edward N. Luttwak has suggested that the Joint Staff has grown in power and influence in a way that is totally out of proportion to its role: "... the power of decision that our civilian president is supposed to exercise through his appointed civilian officials has been seized by an all- military outfit that most Americans never heard of: the mixed Army- Navy- Marine- Air force "Joint Staff."¹⁰⁴ Luttwak has argued that diminished civilian control has given way to "the reign of the Joint Staff"¹⁰⁵ In the Goldwater- Nichols era, the Joint Staff has indeed gained prestige and possibly greater influence.

Once considered undesirable, joint duty is now aggressively sought by the

officer corps. The services now select their best officers for joint duty.¹⁰⁶ This focusing of officer talent has given rise to fears that the Joint Staff is engaged in competition with its civilian heads. Luttwak subscribes to this view: "... the power of the Joint Staff persists undiminished, at the expense of the civilians of the office of the Secretary of Defense."¹⁰⁷

Similar concerns have been expressed regarding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Former Chairman Gen. Colin Powell was the object of particular criticism. As the first Chairman to operate totally under the umbrella of Goldwater- Nichols (Powells predecessor, Admiral Crowe, served under Goldwater- Nichols only during the second half of his term) Powell became perhaps the most well known and effective Chairman in U.S. history. He was, however, severely criticized by academicians, politicians and the media for a combination of perceived transgressions against the tradition of civilian control. USA Today has stated that "... Powell reinvented the chairman job by being a high-profile political player."¹⁰⁸ Time magazine claimed that Powell was permitted to rule the military as a "de facto Deputy Secretary" and even reported that senior officials within the Clinton administration thought him guilty of "insubordination" because of his views on gays in the military.¹⁰⁹

The most explosive criticism of Gen Powell has come from military historian Richard Kohn. Kohn has written extensively on what he refers to as the military's "expanded influence" and the Chairman's "swollen powers."¹¹⁰

Kohn's fundamental criticism is that Powell has overstepped the military's role in the civil-military equation.

General Powell took it upon himself to be the arbiter of American military intervention overseas, an unprecedented role for a senior military officer . . . under his leadership the uniformed military gained an enormous public voice on the subject of when, where, and in what circumstances American military power should be used.¹¹¹

Rather than violating the boundaries of the civil-military relationship, it can be argued that Powell was merely attempting to adhere to the mandate of Congress and the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms reinforced the leading role of the Chairman in developing military strategy (ironically these reforms were generally opposed by the military).¹¹² "If Powell succeeded in shaping the debate over national security strategy, it is a tribute to his powers of intellect and persuasion, not a manifestation of some sinister conspiracy of the military."¹¹³

Civilian leaders may find that in the Goldwater-Nichols era it may be more difficult to attract enough military literate civilians capable of effectively overwatching a more strategically astute military. This problem may be more acute for the country in future years.

Future administrations will find it... difficult to produce sufficient numbers of knowledgeable and experienced Meritocratic Class civilians capable of matching the growing sophistication of the Joint Staff and other military leaders.¹¹⁴

The end of the Cold War and the advent of the Goldwater- Nichols Act have changed the nature of military operations in the civil- military equation. The military is no longer purely an instrument of brute force. It has become for better or worse the primary problem solving instrument used by the nation in international affairs, participating in numerous operations other than war. "Predictably, the military is becoming the agent of first recourse for the U.S. governments thorniest problems both at home and abroad"¹¹⁵ In contrast to earlier times, the country is apt to see it's military establishment take a more active role in the formulation of national strategy.

Civil- military relations were simplified in the nineteenth century by the quarantine of the military, both intellectually and geographically, and by the rigid distinction between war and peace. The Cold War demanded a more holistic strategy, but the future is likely to require an even more inclusive notion possibly leading to a fundamental transformation of U. S. civil- military relations ¹¹⁶

Strategic sophistication of other than war operations has increasingly forced the military into the strategic- diplomatic arena. Clear lines between the military and political spheres of influence are elusive.¹¹⁷ The military, propelled by the spark of Goldwater- Nichols has moved forward creating a noticeable separation from its civilian leadership in organizational sophistication and perhaps even strategic vision. The "reign of the Joint Staff" alluded to by Luttwak may reflect his growing discomfort at a civilian leadership class too eager to defer complicated strategic and operational issues exclusively to the military.¹¹⁸ In addition, the powerful catalyst of Goldwater- Nichols is likely to ensure an extremely unified

military establishment now and in the future. The challenge for civilian leadership is to maintain a strategic view and overall competence that will narrow the organizational and intellectual gap between itself and the military and thus foster confident and effective civilian control.

IV: The Media and the Military

The framers of the U.S. Constitution ensured a central role for the press in facilitating democracy in the United States.¹¹⁹ The desire to guarantee that the press would fulfill this role led the framers to include language in the First Amendment explicitly denying Congress the authority to make any law "abridging freedom of speech, or of the press."¹²⁰ There is, however, no language in the Constitution that addresses the responsibilities of the press in wartime nor its general responsibilities toward the military. Nonetheless, the press has developed a tradition as an independent observer and watchdog over the country's institutions of power. This tradition of scrutiny extends to the military. Keeping the country informed concerning military matters is at times difficult given the often ambiguous and contentious nature of media-military relations. At least one prominent reporter has characterized modern American media-military relations as a "legacy of distrust."¹²¹

Hedrick Smith, a Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times writer, has outlined the tension that has arisen in American media-military relations:

By now it is a commonplace observation that there is an inevitable clash of cultures between the disciplined, hierarchial military, responding to the call of duty, patriotism, and team instincts, and the free-wheeling, individualistic press, instinctively mistrustful of officialdom and authority, and motivated to break news and make headlines.¹²²

The recent Persian Gulf War was an example of the clash of the media and military cultures. The war was a setback for the healthy tension that ideally

should characterize a balanced media-military relationship.¹²³

The general decline in media-military relations did not, however, occur as a result of the Gulf War. It has been a product of steadily increasing strain that has its roots in the Vietnam experience. Key events over the last 15 years have served to complicate media-military relations, and at times, turn adversarial respect into mutual resentment and hostility. Each side has on numerous occasions, made bitter accusations against the other. ABC newsman Peter Jennings complained during the Gulf War that the U.S. military conducted a major effort to "suffocate" impartial reporting.¹²⁴ NBC vice president for news, Ron Nessen, stated: "The Pentagon has won the last battle of the Vietnam War. It was fought in the sands of Saudi Arabia, and the defeated enemy was us (the media)."¹²⁵ In an atmosphere of claim and counter-claim, media-military relations may be more troubled than ever. Given the media's important role, this antagonistic trend does not bode well for healthy civil-military relations.

Historically, the U.S. military has imposed some degree of restriction on the media during military operations. In Vietnam, however, these restrictions were minimal and did not significantly limit media access to troops in the field. Reporters had nearly total freedom of movement and functioned without censorship. Many in the military at that time believed that critical reporting by the media was responsible for turning U.S. public opinion against the Vietnam War.¹²⁶ This may explain the hostility that some in the officer corps still harbor for the media.

"It is clear that today's officer corps carries as part of its cultural baggage a loathing for the press."¹²⁷ The belief among professional military officers that the media contributed to America's defeat in Vietnam has persisted to the present time. It is the principal reason for continuing animosity between the media and the military.¹²⁸ However, military suspicions about press actions in Vietnam may be unfounded. Author William Hammond supports this notion citing the Army's own official history of Vietnam: "It is undeniable. . . that press reports were. . . often more accurate than the public statements of the administration in portraying the situation in Vietnam."¹²⁹

In the post Vietnam era most of America's military operations have had a subplot of media-military confrontation. The U.S. action in Grenada represented a turning point in media-military relations. "The press was literally left behind as U.S. troops attacked Grenada on 25 October 1983."¹³⁰ Journalists were forced to charter boats in order to get to the island and cover the story. The military did not lift restrictions on the press until the 30th of October.¹³¹ Although the military tried to justify this lack of access due to logistical, safety and operational concerns, the restrictions clearly reflected the continuation of post Vietnam suspicion of the media. The then Secretary of State, George Shultz, expressed both the sentiments of the administration and the military when he said: "These days, in the adversary journalism that's been developed, it seems as though the reporters are always against us. And when you're trying to conduct a military operation, you don't need that."¹³²

This attitude toward the media carried over to later operations.

The December 1989 invasion of Panama did nothing to improve the relations between the media and the military. By the time that this operation was conducted press pools were in existence. The pools were designed to facilitate media coverage of military operations. Established in 1985 as a result of the Grenada operation, pools were used in combat for the first time during the Panama operation. Once again, however, the media was frustrated in its attempt to cover the operation. Some accused the highest echelons of the defense establishment with conspiring to control the media. "U.S. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney. . . interpreted the pools as a means of restricting, not facilitating, media coverage of U.S. military operations."¹³³ In Panama, the media pool was actually detained until the fighting was over. The one vehicle designed to improve media-military relations during military operations, the press pool, was fundamentally a failure.¹³⁴

The New York Times, in an editorial on the subject of media-military relations, specifically singled out the Grenada and Panama operations for criticism.

The record is clear-cut. On the 1983 invasion of Grenada, the press was excluded entirely. In the 1989 Panama landing, the Pentagon press pool was brought in four hours after the fighting had started and held in restricted circumstances for another six.¹³⁵

As controversial as the Grenada and Panama experiences were, Operation Desert Storm proved even more harmful to media-military relations. Once again

the military has been accused by the media of attempting to control access and information. In a blunt assessment of the situation, combat reporter Joe Galloway gave this candid view of the military's media policy: "Control those folks, spin those folks, segregate those folks."¹³⁶ The media was especially frustrated at overt attempts to contain members of the press in specified geographic areas, allowing no unescorted access to military units. Media policy as seen by members of the press can be best summed up this way:

Any ambiguity in the media's relationship with the government began to fade between the Vietnam and Gulf wars. By the time of Operation Desert Storm, the media's ability to provide independent analysis had been substantially reduced. The media containment policy of the U.S. military ensured that the press coverage of the conflict would not be undermined by the perceived influence of an oppositional media.¹³⁷

The issue of access to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf was central to media-military relations. Newsweek media critic Jonathan Alter expressed an opinion typical of the media point of view.

To me one of the most frightening aspects of the war for the American media has to do with access. . . Our "open" society was the most closed of any of the coalition on the ground. . . That suggests just how powerful the legacy of Vietnam was in the military's considerations. As far as I can tell this is the first war in American history where the press was not allowed access to the battlefield.¹³⁸

If the policy of containing the media was intended to prevent negative press, then it also blocked positive stories and messages. According to one public affairs analyst, "In the Gulf, a few people did their best to hinder the very media coverage that was so vital for influencing world opinion"¹³⁹ More importantly the military seems to have prevented the media from reporting positive stories that

could have enhanced America's image throughout the Gulf region and the world. "Too often, however, we treated the media (whom we needed to communicate our decency to the world) with open hostility."¹⁴⁰

Isolated from the force, the press was given only escorted glimpses of U.S. military units. "The (military) leadership chose to hide a great force."¹⁴¹ By denying the media free access to the U.S. military in the Gulf, the press (and by extension, the American people), was prevented from seeing and reporting on a highly trained, motivated, and competent military organization. Peter Jennings complained that "... there was no opportunity for millions of us to see anything of the bravery or dedication of the US soldiers on the battlefield."¹⁴² Combat reporter Galloway expressed a similar criticism. "The military had the opportunity to send bright young reporters with bright young officers to share the rigors of war together, yet it chose segregation."¹⁴³ This blunt reproach of the military should register with credibility, since it comes from a reporter highly respected by professional soldiers.

There is another side to the media-military conflict. From the military point of view, the media is no friend of the armed forces. The military's perception of media hostility and bias has been highlighted by some independent observers. Writing in a recent edition of Armed Forces Journal, editor-at-large David Silverberg suggests that one of America's most popular media icons, "60 Minutes", is uniformly negative in its coverage of the military. "In few areas has '60 Minutes' distorted reality more than in its coverage of the US military and defense

related topics."¹⁴⁴ Silverberg is even more blunt in his overall assessment:

"... they invariably make the point that the American military is wasteful, corrupt, bigoted, or incompetent."¹⁴⁵ Although one mans opinion, it may accurately reflect the perceptions that many professional military officers hold concerning perceived media bias.

The influence of the media whether bias or not, is especially influential, since U.S. society often has no other first or secondhand experiences with the military that could provide context or balance. Just how significant this is can be seen in the comments of a veteran writing in Newsweek about his personal experiences at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. In describing his classmates attitude toward the military he wrote:

The nonchalance of my classmates, I soon found was not due to some sort of militant pacifism or left wing prejudice. The sum total of their knowledge about military matters -- ranging from tactics to tanks came from the movies and magazine articles . . . this might be comical if it weren't for the fact that Georgetown grads end up in high places.¹⁴⁶

Another perception commonly held by the military concerns perceived media qualifications to cover the military. The evidence from the Gulf War seems to support the thesis that the media was in general unfamiliar with and hence, essentially unprepared to effectively cover the military.

NBC Pentagon reporter Fred Francis called the descent of hundreds of reporters into the Pentagon and Saudi briefing rooms during Operation Desert Storm, the "invasion of the food editors."¹⁴⁷ His point was that the American news media lacked the proper qualificationa and experience to cover the worlds

most sophisticated military organization. This view was supported by media colleague Jack Nelson of the Los Angeles Times. Referring to media coverage of the Persian Gulf War he said: "Where we got the biggest black eye was in those briefings where you had reporters with no experience. . . asking questions that many people considered asinine."¹⁴⁸

One author claims that journalism is one of only two profession (the other being the law profession), that claims universal competence on the basis of entry-level training.¹⁴⁹ This may explain why the media does not emphasize special qualifications for military reporting. "To journalists, the military is just another huge bureaucracy to report on, no different that Exxon or Congress."¹⁵⁰

The issue of media experience and qualification was a subject of discussion at a recent seminar sponsored by the Freedom Forum in April 1995. Panel members at the seminar agreed, that since the end of the draft, the number of reporters with military experience has "decreased dramatically."¹⁵¹ Thomas Lippman, former Washington Post Vietnam reporter and panelist, remarked that "This has created a profound and very dangerous disconnect between people in our business and people in the military."¹⁵²

Joe Galloway, unrestrained in his criticism of the military's handling of the media, shows equal candor in evaluating his own profession. Referring to the vast majority of reporters covering Operation Desert Storm as "militarily illiterate", he stated that "If there were 20 or 30 out of 1000 that had ever seen a recent training exercise or heard a shot fired in anger I would be surprised."¹⁵³

One nationwide survey conducted in 1989 indicated that there were only some 90 full-time military reporters in U. S. journalism.¹⁵⁴ This is a relatively small number compared to the sea of media that would eventually cover the Gulf War. The trend of inexperience and disinterest may be continuing. Journalist Ed Offley relates his personal experiences as the sole military reporter covering a major military exercise:

When Pacific Command put 30,000 military personnel into the field to test its new post-Cold War fighting doctrine in mid-1992, I found myself in sole possession of the Navy's 3rd Fleet, Marine Expeditionary Force, and various Army and Air Force units during 10 days of intensive mock combat from mid-Pacific to the aerial gunnery ranges of Arizona . . . journalistic interest in covering the military has all but vanished.¹⁵⁵

The amount of experience required for military reporting is debatable. Some in the media think that experience with the military is secondary to other intangible qualities. Associated Press reporter George Esper, who covered Vietnam for 10 years has said: ". . . tenacity and stamina were more important in the field than military knowledge."¹⁵⁶

The case has been made by at least one former military public affairs officer that ". . . the media's competence is none of our business."¹⁵⁷ He may be right. Perhaps all the military should concern itself with is explaining its actions, clearly, forthrightly, and promptly. The military has no mandate to pass judgment on press qualifications.

Legendary CBS newsman Walter Cronkite once provided a prescription for media-military relations.

He said that the military "... has the responsibility of giving all the information it possibly can to the press and the press has every right, to the point of insolence to demand this."¹⁵⁸ This is good advice for for both institutions.

Analysis of media-military relations clearly establishes that the military is hostile toward journalists, while journalists are indifferent toward the military.¹⁵⁹ The media should make a credible effort to mitigate it's indifference toward the military by better informing and preparing itself to cover military operations. Clearly the media can and should find ways to improve its capabilities for effective and competent military coverage.

The military may have a greater challenge in overcoming it's ingrained hostility toward the media. Retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor has identified perhaps the most significant challenge for the military in this regard.

This is the challenge to today and tommorrow's military leaders: they must regain the respect and confidence of the media that they once had in the dark days of a long-ago war. The press is not going to go away, but the antimedia attitude that has been fostered in young officers must be exorcised if both institutions are to serve the republic.¹⁶⁰

In the final analysis the military must understand and be supportive of the role of the press in a democracy and it must be proactive in establishing trust and effective relations with the media.

V. Conclusions

Is there a "crisis" in civil-military relations? The concise answer is no. The American legacies of liberalism and civilian control act as a self correcting force. Richard Kohn, perhaps the most outspoken proponent of the "crisis theory", is ultimately optimistic in his assessment of the issue:

Our military community retains enough diversity of perspective and is so committed in its loyalties to our form of government and the belief in civilian control as a foundation of American liberty so pervades our society, that a direct challenge is all but inconceivable¹⁶¹

What may appear to be a crisis in civil-military relations is, in reality, a "... change in conditions to which civil-military relations must adapt."¹⁶² While there may be no "crisis" in the sense that the Founding Fathers may have feared from standing armies or coup d'etat, the growing organizational sophistication of the military demands the focused attention of civilian leadership. The tendency of American society to take civilian control for granted seems neither wise nor practical in the Goldwater-Nichols era. If there is a hint of a crisis, it lies not with the military's unwillingness to subordinate itself, but with the potential inability of future generations of civilian leadership to exercise proper supervision.

The military's expanded influence has stemmed, in part, from the inattention or even abdication of civilian leadership.¹⁶³ Richard Kohn agrees that much of the problem resides on the civilian side of the relationship.¹⁶⁴ Future

administrations must still attract quality civilian leadership to government service despite the fact that the best colleges and universities neglect the study of war and the military.¹⁶⁵ The general lack of personal or professional experience in military affairs evident within civilian society is an issue that needs further examination.

The cumulative effects of traditional American liberalism and the arrival of postmodern militarism have by and large left a generation of present and future civilian leadership with little understanding of the military institution. Ironically, even Kohn suggests a major role for the military in addressing civil- military relations: "Our military leadership must be prepared to mentor young officers as well as educate civilian leaders on proper roles and behavior in the civil- military relationship."¹⁶⁶

An important first step in this process should include more indepth exposure and instruction for military officers regarding the media. Today, as in former times, "...young and old military people seemed to be gripped by powerful myths about the media. . ."¹⁶⁷ Similar myths also appear to prevade the media perspective of the military. These kinds of myths can manifest themselves with unfortunate consequences. Army veteran and Newsweek reporter, David Hackworth reflected on experiences during Desert Storm that demonstrate this: "I had more guns pointed at me by Americans or Saudis who were into controlling the press than in all my years of combat."¹⁶⁸

One way the military can improve its own understanding of proper civil-

military relations, is to expand its formal contact with the media. The current state of media-military relations indicate that it is time for each of the service staff and war colleges to consider establishing full- time chairs in journalism. These chairs could be filled annually on a rotating basis by prominent members of the print or broadcast media, much in the same way some of the schools used to sponsor visiting history professors. Service schools at the staff and war college level and the Unified Commands should also consider the integration of college journalism students into exercises and wargames. The chance for journalism students to participate (role play press and public affairs positions for example) and interact with military students and units could be invaluable. Unless the military takes the initiative, its likely that the future generations of media and military will continue to have minimal mutual contact and remain a mystery to each other. The need to expose the military and media to each other is real. Both professions (and the country) can benefit from the understanding that a healthy adversarial relationship should not degenerate into outright antagonism.¹⁶⁹

Richard Kohn challenges the civilian community to bear a large share of the responsibility to sustain good civil- military relations. "The faculties of our universities will have to encourage teaching and research in military affairs, to provide a national leadership that is educated about war and peace and the proper role of the military"¹⁷⁰ A logical place to educate civilians in defense and security affairs is the service staff and war colleges. This is currently being done

to some degree.¹⁷¹ However, this type of formal education in the service schools reaches only a handful of civilians and there is no assurance that the appropriate civilians will benefit. Furthermore, it does not encourage the active involvement of civilian institutions. The answer to Kohn's challenge may lie in a totally unique solution-- a National Civilian Defense Corps (NCDC).¹⁷² The objective of forming such a "corps" of civilians would be to establish a pool of key civilian leaders knowledgeable in military affairs, competent to assume leadership positions in the Department of Defense. Professor Eliot Cohen has warned that ". . . there is a great need to improve the military literacy, as it were, of American leaders. . . while engaging the military in some soul-searching about its relationship to the larger society."¹⁷³

Ideally the NCDC would be civilian run with vigorous involvement of civilian academic institutions as envisioned by Dr. Kohn. Necessarily, membership in the NCDC would not be full-time. The NCDC should consist of prominent citizens from academia, industry, government, media and even the professions, such as law and medicine. Members of the NCDC could be nominated by their congressional representatives, self selected or some combination of the two. Safeguards against undue political influence of the program should be considered. NCDC membership would complement an individual's full time civilian occupation, hence it must be structured to accommodate this fact and encourage participation. Civilian, not military administration of the NCDC, is crucial. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) is the logical choice to administer the program. The Joint Staff and National Defense University (NDU) have the resources to support OSD in program execution. Support of academic institutions specializing in disciplines such as international relations, strategic studies and national security affairs would lend credibility to such a program. While curriculum cannot be addressed in any detail here, some general guidelines are appropriate. The NCDC program could be generally divided into three phases:

Phase I (*initial certification education*): A two week in residence course conducted at the NDU focusing on U.S national security policy, organization and capabilities of the Department of Defense and military services, and an overview of the principles of strategy.

Phase II (*continuing education*). Regional seminars conducted twice yearly at civilian education institutions throughout the country. NCDC members attend the seminar(s) in their home region. Defense seminars are designed to enable NCDC members to stay current in contemporary defense and security issues.

Phase III (*transition training*): This extended phase is conducted for those members of the NCDC selected / appointed to positions of leadership in the DOD. Instruction in this phase would be conducted at the NDU and contain a more advanced strategic/ operational focus as determined by OSD. Consideration might also be given to establishing annual NCDC fellowships at OSD, the Joint Staff, and selected unified commands.

A program such as the NCDC is a radical shift from the rather halting way in which past administrations have selected and nominated key defense civilians. Providing a pool of civilians to future Presidents, knowledgeable and informed on matters of defense, is certainly worth the minimal investment likely required by DOD. This is especially true if it insures more effective and competent civilian control. Properly balanced with a mixture of relevant education and hands-on exposure to the military, a degree of practical experience can keep the NCDC from becoming a meritocracy itself. Such a program seems to fit at least one authors' prescription for building civilian control.

Real civilian control does not stem from the firing of generals or their public rebuke . . . it consists in affection and respect for military values and the men and women who adhere to them, combined with a remorseless and probing examination of how military organizations do their business.¹⁷⁴

This means that the civilian leadership must be necessarily as concerned with the process of military effectiveness as much as the result. This is especially important in periods of great turbulence and uncertainty. "As the armed forces shrink, civilian leaders have a particular responsibility to review ...and monitor the temperment of military organizations."¹⁷⁵

Alexander Hamilton, observed in The Federalist papers that nations are " . . . subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war. . . "¹⁷⁶ Hamilton realized the nation could not escape the reality of world events nor the necessity of a standing military force.

If . . . it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle, which the world has yet seen-- that of a nation incapacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense.¹⁷⁷

He seemed to know that a growing country would someday have to emerge from its Jeffersonian distrust and disinterest in things military. Given the prominence of a large military establishment in modern America, citizens of this age must also shed at least their disinterest if not their distrust of the military establishment.

The military must also play a central role in promoting good civil-military relations. "The most important way the military affects civil-military relations is through cultivation of attitudes among its ranks."¹⁷⁸ This means that the military must take actions that foster civilian trust in the armed forces. It is incumbent upon the military to use its educational institutions, command information programs and even its official ceremonies in a manner that promotes the image and reality of a military establishment obedient to civilian authority. The military must understand that it is the subject of civil-military relations rather than a full partner; hence, its role and function are largely determined by civilian authority.¹⁷⁹

Finally, it is important to recognize the reality that the military can inadvertently intimidate and alienate civilians.¹⁸⁰ The military talks, dress, and behaves in different ways than civilian society. Ultimately, the military

professional can be alien to mainstream America. Reaching out to civilian society directly and through the media is critical as the armed forces shrink in size. The armed forces should not let itself become separated from the American mainstream. The military must make itself, within limits, transparent to the society it serves. Failure to do so may bring a genuine crisis in civil- military relations.

Endnotes

1. Eliot A. Cohen, "Beyond Bottom Up," National Review, November 15, 1993, 42.
2. Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control," The National Interest, Spring 1994, 4.
3. Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control From McClelland to Powell", Journal of Military History, 57,(October 1994): 27-58.
4. Cohen, "Beyond Bottom Up," 40.
5. Eliot Cohen, "Making Do With Less or Coping With Upton's Ghost". Paper prepared for U.S Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. (April 1995): 23.
6. Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Security Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Fourth edition, 1993), 57.
7. Kohn, "Out of Control," 4.
8. Mark Perry, Four Stars, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), XV.
9. Ibid.
10. A.J. Bacevich, "Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction, Armed Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1994-5, 78.
11. Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "American Civil- Military Relations: The State of the Debate", The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, 210.
12. Jordan , American National Security, 181. The authors state: "The size of the American defense establishment and the evolution of the military's definition of it's own character suggest that the military will continue to influence American national security policy.
13. Johnson and Metz, The Washington Quarterly, 211.
14. Ibid.
15. William Perry, Secretary of Defense, speech, 2 February 1995, available through the United States Naval Institute, via United Communications Group online service.
16. Ibid.

17. Katherine Boo, "How Congress Won the Gulf War," The Washington Quarterly, October 1991, 31-37.
18. Col Charles J. Dunlap, USAF, Welcome to the Junta: "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, (Summer 1994): 375. The Goldwater - Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has had a sweeping effect on military organization and operations. Mark Perry writing in Four Stars (339-340) has stated that the Act vastly improved U.S. capabilities. "The nations military programs and policies would be designed by an independent staff of joint officers answering to a chairman; their policies would no longer be the product of a JCS committee beholden to the individual services" Katherine Boo Writing in the Oct 1991 issue of The Washington Monthly (31-32) goes even farther in praise of the Act." . . .this technocratic reform measure shifted control of military operations from four competing Washington bureauacracies-- the freewheeling services-- to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) and a single , independent field commander (during war). . . Goldwater- Nichols intent -- and its stunning accomplishment -- was to drian the military's bureauacracic swamp. . .By moving the strategizing out of the four service bureauracracies to central command posts in Washington and the field, the new system gave the President, for the first time since 1947, confidence that the military operations suggested by the JCS chairman, Colin Powell, were not a political compromise but a strategy"
19. Richard H. Kohn, "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, 14 April 1994, (editorial page).
20. Ibid. See Dunlap's description in chapter V., "Welcome to the Junta." See also "Life Among the Meritocrats," U.S. News and World Report, August 30/ September 6, 1993.
21. Thomas E. Ricks, "Out and Down," The Wall Street Journal, 30 March, 1993, P-1.
22. Samuel Huntington, "Samuel Huntington Responds," The National Interest, Summer 1994, 29.
23. LTG Bernard E. Trainor, "The Military's War with the Media: Causes and Consequences," in Defense Beat, edited by Loren Thompson, (Lexington Books: New York, 1991), 73.
24. Kohn, "Richard H. Kohn Responds", The National Interest, Summer 1994, 29.
25. Johnson and Metz, The Washington Quarterly, 210.
26. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge , Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 143.
27. Encyclopedia of American Political History, 1984. ed., s.v. "Liberalism."
28. Academic American Encyclopedia, 1995, ed., s.v. "Liberalism."
29. Funk and Wagnalls Deluxe Encyclopedia, 1986 ed., s.v. "Liberalism."

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher, and Robert Lee Wolf, Modern Civilization, (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey Prentice Hall, 1962), 317.
33. Encyclopedia of American Political History, 1984 ed., s.v. "Liberalism" and "Jeffersonian democracy."
34. Ibid., 676.
35. Ibid., 674.
36. Ibid.
37. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 4.. Weigley states that "To make possible a stronger military defense and the better assertion of national interests were among the motives which shaped the Constitution of 1787, and The Federalist papers (which) have much to say about the military advantages of the proposed new frame of government." The Federalist papers are commonly attributed to three writers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 40.
40. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, The Media Elite, (Bethesda, Md: Alder&Alder, 1986), 2.
41. Ibid.
42. Funk and Wagnalls Deluxe Encyclopedia, 1986 ed., s.v. "John Locke." Locke held that revolution was an obligation not just a right. He advocated a system of checks and balances in government, the separation of church and state and the duty of government to protect natural and property rights of its citizens. Many of his political ideas were embodied in the U.S. Constitution.
43. Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant, (New York: Random House, 1986), 30.
44. Richard H.Kohn, The United States Military Under the Constitution 1789- 1989 (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 81.
45. Ibid., 82.

46. Kohn, The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, , 82, Quoting from James Madison's notes 14 Sept 1787, 2:617.
47. Hadley, The Straw Giant, 30.
48. Kohn, The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States 1789-1989, 85.
49. Ibid.
50. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 163. Huntington states that : "the essence of civilian control...is a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities and the institutional subordination of the latter to the former. These are unknown to the Constitution, which mixes political and military functions, interjecting politics into military affairs and military affairs into politics...Civilian control has at times existed in the United States, but it has emerged despite rather than because of constitutional provisions"
51. Ibid.
52. Kohn, "Out of Control, The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," 16.
53. Ibid. Kohn's definition of civilian control: "civilian control means that the policies and procedures governing our military affairs- at home and abroad, during peace and war, from matters of minor detail such as the penalty for an infraction of the rules by a private at some distant post- are determined by civilian authorities."
54. Ibid., 144.
55. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 144.
56. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 20.
57. Ibid., 370.
57. Ibid., 371.
59. Ibid., 372.
60. Hadley, The Straw Giant, 278.
61. Objective civilian control is defined by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State, 80-85.
62. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 168.
63. The term "Baby Boomers" is the commonly used collective term referring to that part of the American population born between 1946 and 1965. This boom in population represents the

increase attributed to returning veterans of World war II who started families during this period. The "meritocracy" is a subset of the Baby Boom generation and likely will continue beyond the demographic bounds of this population group.

64. See "Life Among the Meritocrats," US News and World Report, August 30/ September 6 1993, p-30-31. Col Charles J.Dunlap writing in the Wake Forest Law Review (Summer1994) points out the fact that the military also is a meritocracy: "...the military is itself a meritocracy, but a very different one from that which produces the Meritocratic Class now assuming power. In the armed forces, advancement is based largely on the demonstrated ability to succeed in often difficult environments through the orchestration of a complex amalgam of people and machines.

65. Nicholas Lemann, "Curse of The Merit Class," Washington Post, 9 February, 1992., B-1.

66. Ibid.

67. Lemann, "The Curse of the Merit Class," B-1 : Lemann states: "The essential formative experience of the meritocratic upper class is educational overachievement."

68. Ibid., B-4.

69. Ibid.

70. Paul Glastris, "Life Among the Meritocrats," US News and World Report, 30.

71. Ibid., 30-31.

72. Fred Barnes, "No-Doz," The New Republic, 3 May, 1993, 9. In a follow- on article appearing in the 13 September,1993 issue of The New Republic, "Shali, Shan't He?", Fred Barnes describes the decision making process used by the White House staff to assist the President in selecting a replacement for Gen Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barnes describes President Clinton as typically possessed of the meritocracy's lack of knowledge of the armed forces:"Clinton after all, is famously unfamiliar with the armed forces in general and not intimately acquainted with individual generals."

73. Ibid.

74. Christopher Farrell, "A Skewed View of What Ails America," Business Week, 6 February, 1995, 17.

75. David Broder, "Bill Clinton's Difficulties Have Historical Origins," The Kansas City Star, 14 September, 1994, C-7. Although Broder refers specifically to "baby boomers," the meritocracy, a major subset, is equally affected.

76. Richard Miles, "Those Who Fight, Those Who Decide," Newsweek, 22 November, 1993, 12.
77. Odom, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, 24.
78. Hadley, The Straw Giant, 31.
79. Miles, Newsweek, 12.
80. John Wheeler, "Veterans Don't Seem to Look Like America," Washington Times, 9 June, 1994. Statistics used by the author of this article were drawn from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Congressional Directory, Federal Staff Directory, and Statistical Abstract for the United States.
81. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol 29, No. 2, (Summer 1994), 366. (quoting David S. Broder, "Clinton's Civilians," Washington Post, Nat'l Wkly Ed, Jan 3-9, 1994, at 4)
82. Cohen, "Making Do With less, Or Coping With Upton's Ghost," Paper prepared for the U.S. Army War College, April 1995, 23.
83. Miles, Newsweek, 12.
84. Dunlap, "Welcome To the Junta," 367.
85. Ibid., 387-388. Dunlap describes postmodern militarism as a phenomenon that "arises when a citizenry embraces permissive individualism. Postmodern militarism admires the effectiveness of the military but rejects for civilian society the discipline and sacrifice necessary to achieve it.... The nation's people celebrate military power without truly understanding the institution that produces it". Although this infatuation with military power might on the surface seem like a rejection of liberalism's traditional hostility toward the military, a distinction must be made between the power the military provides the nation and the institution itself.
86. Odom, The National Interest, 25.
87. James Burk, "Major Trends In Civil-Military Relations," Texas A&M University. Paper prepared for conference on "Sociology and War", Triangle Universities Security Seminar, Chapel Hill, N.C. (18 November, 1994): 20.
88. Colin Powell, Gen USA (ret.), "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations", The National Interest, Summer 1994, 23.
89. Hackett, The Profession of Arms, 158.
90. Dunlap, "Welcome To the Junta," 388.

91. Lasch, Christopher, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 4.
92. "Today's USAREUR: An Overview," United States Army Europe Command Briefing, April 1995, Slide 4..
93. See "Secretary Perry Recommends Closing, Realigning 146 Bases," Secretary of Defense William Perry's speech, 2 February 1995, available through the United States Naval Institute, via United Communications Group online service.
94. Cohen, "Making Do With Less," 23.
95. Bruce W. Nelan, "Ready for Action," Time, 12 November, 1990, 28. Nelan quotes Lawrence Korb of the Brookings Institution: "Goldwater- Nichols changed the Pentagon like nothing else in memory." See also Katherine Boo, "How Congress Won the War in the Gulf," The Washington Monthly, October 1991. This article attributes the U.S. success in the Persian Gulf War to the passage of the Goldwater- Nichols Act.
96. Johnson and Metz, "American Civil- Military Relations," 202.
97. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), 10.
98. Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Civilian Control: A National Crisis?," Armed Forces Journal, Autumn/ Winter 1994/95, 83.
99. Johnson and Metz, The Washington Quarterly, 209.
100. Ibid. Owens makes the point that "... better educated officers frequently compete with civilians who are technocrats rather than innovative thinkers, appointees whose jobs are repayments for political debts, and a Pentagon bureaucracy that is increasingly designed to look like America."
101. Johnson and Metz, The Washington Quarterly, 209.
102. Col Charles J. Dunlap Jr. USAF, "A Fallow Challenge to Civilian Control?," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1995, 103.
103. James Kitfield, "Pentagon Power Shift," Government Executive, April 1994, 72, cited in Douglas V. Johnson and Steven Metz, "American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems," Strategic Studies Institute. U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 24 April, 1995. 13.
104. Ibid., 29.
105. Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, 30.

106. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Civilian Control: A National Crisis?," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/ Winter 1994-95, 83 and Gerald F. Seib, "Military Reform Has Given Field Commanders Decisive Roles and Reduced Interservice Rivalry," The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1991, A-12-13.
107. Luttwak, Washinton's Biggest Scandal," 31.
108. Judy Keen, "Shalikashili Worries Troops Will Get Hurt," USA Today, 23-25 September, 1994, 1A.
109. Bruce Van Voorst, "The Rebellious Soldier," Time, Feb 15, 1994.
110. Richard Kohn, "Upstarts in Uniform," New York Times , 14 April, 1994 (editorial page).
111. Kohn, "Out of Control," 3.
112. Owens, "Civilian Control," 81.
113. Ibid.
114. Dunlap, "Welcome To the Junta," 378.
115. . Dunlap, "A Fallow Challenge," 103.
116. Johnson and Metz, "American Civil- Military," 210.
117. Cohen, "Making Do With Less," 23.
118. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," 29. Luttwak goes so far as to say that the military in the form of the Joint Staff has actually seized the presidents " power of decision."
119. Loren B. Thompson editor, Defense Beat, The Dilemmas of Defense Coverage, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 3.
120. Ibid.
121. Thomas W. Lippman, "The Briefers and the Press: Combatants on This Side of the Line," cited in The Gulf War The Media, Hedrick Smith editor, (Washington D.C.: Seven Locks Press, 1992), 88.
122. Ibid., XVII.
123. Andrew Parasiliti, "The Military ,The Media, and the Gulf War" in The Gulf War and The New World Order, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, (Gainsville: University of Florida Press 1994), 258.

124. Major General Perry M. Smith (RET), How CNN Fought the War, (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1991), 180.
125. Ron Nessen, "The Pentagon Censors," Washington Post. 12 January 1991. (editorial page)
126. Parasiliti, "The Military, The Media and the Gulf War," 242.
127. Ibid., 243
128. Thompson, Defense Beat, 47.
129. William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988). 338.
130. Parasiliti, "The Military, The Media and the Gulf War," 244.
131. Ibid
132. Peter Braestrup, Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media. (New York: Priority Press Publications), 133.
133. Parasiliti, "The Media, The Military, and the Gulf War," 245.
134. Thompson, Defense Beat, 79.
135. "Military Censorship Lives", New York Times, 21 September, 1994, A-22.
136. Galloway, "Media-Military Relations."
137. Parasiliti, "The Media, The Military, and the Gulf War," 244.
138. Dennis, The Media At War, 66.
139. Noyes, "Like it Or Not," 31.
140. Ibid., 32.
141. Galloway, "Media-Military Relations."
142. Smith, How CNN Fought The War, 180.
143. Ibid.
144. David Silverberg, "Why The Military Can't Get An Even Break," Armed Forces Journal, February 1995, 30.

145. Ibid.
146. Miles, Newsweek, 12.
147. Ed Offley, "Covering The Military-- The Press Needs To Get Its Act Together," Editor& Publisher, January 22, 1994, 44.
148. Dennis et al, The Media At War, 70.
149. William V. Kennedy, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Can't Be Trusted to Cover a War. (Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 1993) 152.
150. Thompson, Defense Beat, 75.
151. "Reporters Deny Bias on Vietnam War," Associated Press. 22 April, 1995. Prodigy Services Company Online Service. 4-5.
152. Ibid.
153. Joe Galloway, "Media-Military Relations."
154. Offley, "Covering The Military," 44. The figure of 90 full- time military reporters in U.S. journalism is "... divided equally between the Pentagon press corps and regional reporters whose newspaper markets embrace large military communities"
155. Ibid.
156. "Reporters Deny Bias," 6.
157. Noyes, "Like It Or Not," 32.
158. Smith, The Media and the Gulf War, 266.
159. Trainor, "The Media Versus the Military," in Defense Beat, 75.
160. Trainor, "The Military's War with the Media," in Defense Beat 81.
161. Kohn, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," 31.
162. Owens, "Civilian Control," 82.
163. Richard H. Kohn, "Upstarts In Uniform," New York Times, 14 April 1994, (editorial page).
164. Kohn, "An Exchange On Civil-Military Relations," 29.

165. Ibid., 30.

166. Ibid.

167. Braestrup, Battle Lines, 9.

168. Newsweek, "Newsweeks Troops in the Persian Gulf," March 11, 1991, 4.

169. Ibid.

170. Kohn, "Upstarts in Uniform," (editorial page).

171. Integrating civilians and military students in these institutions is a major step in potentially bridging the gap which currently exists. On average the military has made only a marginal effort to include civilians within the military educational system. For instance in the current academic year (AY) there are no civilians attending the Army Command and General Staff College. The Army War College on the other hand has 20 civilians in attendance while the Air War College ten. Numbers do not tell the whole story. While the civilian population at the service War college level is commendable, most of the students represent the inter-agency organizations such as the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central intelligence Agency . There is essentially no civilian representation from the meritocracy--- the civilian segment that is most in need of military exposure. Statistics are based on information provided by the Director of Academic Operations, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., Dean Of Academic Affairs, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., Director Academic Operations, United States Air War College, Montgomery Al. Note: Army War College civilian attendance for AY 95 is 10 DA civilians, 10 interagency civilians (1 NSA, 1 DIA, 1 DLA, 1 CIA, 5 DoS, 1 FEMA). Air War College civilian attendance for AY 95 is 10 interagency civilians (4 Dos, 1 CIA, 1 NSA, 1 DIA, 1 FAA, 1 DMA, 4 AFMC)

172. The idea of a "Civilian Defense Corps" was first suggested to the author by Col. Charles J. Dunlap, USAF. The concept for implementation is the author's.

173. Cohen, "Making Do With Less," 23.

174. Cohen, "Beyond Bottom Up," 43.

175. Ibid.

176. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 15, in The Federalist Papers, edited by Garry Wills, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 71.

177. Ibid., 123.

178. Johnson and Metz, The Washington Quarterly, 206.
179. Johnson and Metz, "American Civil-Military Relation," 12.
180. Ibid., 11.

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